Observation

Fodor makes the distinction between observation and inference. Observation is more or less perception. It causes belief but it is not propositional, as opposed to inference. Now, belief is a propositional attitude and consequently it is inferential and propositional, so how can observation be causal? Because, says Fodor, of an isomorphism between networks, presumably the network of belief formation and the network of observation. Other philosophy of mind considers observation to be inferential, although quite reliable. The knowledge of observation is equivalent to the Russellian knowledge by acquaintance. However, Russell does not claim that acquaintance involves propositions and for observation to be inferential it must be propositional. If mind is propositional Fodor's impedimenta is unnecessary.

Obsolete

Much of what happens is philosophy is either superfluous, obsolete, or trite. Anti-realism as a debate is dead. Ultra-micro-chip makes connectionism a primitive instrument of AI. "Super-research" has always been done. Deflation is a circular proposition that says "truth is truth".

Other "logics"

Are modal logic and deontic logic examples of valid speculation about logic? Both modal logic and deontic logic rather than formal systems are theories which appeal to formal logic for sanction. Modal logic is the basis of counterfactualism. Counterfactualism is the belief that it is valid to think in terms of what might have been. Histopry, e.g., can be judged and historical theories elaborated which depend on counterfactuals. This is because logic sanctions certain conclusions from empirical data and even though history does not embody or contain such conclusions their logical sanction makes them as valid as the actual record of events. And as to deontic logic it is the theory that it is valid to modify logical inferences if self-interest or some other overpowering value justifies it. The trouble here is that the inferences to which deontic logic applies are already interpretative, hence neither apodictic nor necessary. In sum, deontic logic is pleonastic because it makes claims about inferences that are already implicit in logic itself.
 

Ontological chain

The ontological chain is not the becoming of being. The becoming of being is an historical-epistemological concept. But the becoming of being did allow us to posit the possibility of philosophy of history, hence determinism to some extent. The ontological chain is the metaphorical representation of determinism. From philosophy of history, and consequently also from epistemology, the most justified possibility is determinism. The specific implications of ontological chain are: (1) the existence of the subconscious; (2) the subconscious nature of cognitive processes; (3) the impossibility of a hiatus; and (4) ontological-chain determinism.

Ontological chain and compatibilism

The spontaneous acceptance of the ontological chain is an ethical commitment. But if we are in the ontological chain it cannot be a commitment, it cannot be a choice: we do not actually, from some niche of freedom, choose to do so. We are constrained to acceptance from the ontological chain itself, even if we are conscious of this, even if we feel no constraint whatsoever. There is no possibility of ethical behaviour at all independent of social conditioning.

Is there no room at all for some freedom? There are various propositions to be considered here: the reiteration of thought; the illusion of self-determination; the implicit belief that our acts make sense. By any definition of choice, the iteration or reiteration of thought would seem to evince choice. But is it possible at all to iterate thought? Is the thought iterated not different from the thought? And can we really believe that we can affect thought and behaviour from the reiteration of thought? Even though each act of the life I have led was inevitable in every conceivable way, I also believe that my life could have been different from what it has been. How do I get out of this contradiction? My life would have been different if I had known what I know now or if I had been different from what I was. But these ifs mean that in effect one part of my contradictory or antinomic statement is false and the other is true. I do not know and cannot know that my life could have been different: this is pure contrafactuality. In our actions there is implicit the belief that life and history have "meaning": But this belief, if it is there, is determined. History not only then determines us but it also determines that we accept history in its own gory terms. There is such a thing as "determined choice". Since the languages either for determinsm or freedom are the same and attribution is inevitable and we do have arguments however flawed for freedom: why not say that belief in freedom is perfectly justified? But only freedom within the ontological chain, which is what compatibilism means.

Ontology

Ontology is the branch of metaphysics devoted to the study of being. Wittgenstein sensibly attributed ontology to physics. But this is not the conclusive solution that it seems.

Ontology is the philosophical discipline which deals with one side of the metaphysical polarity, i.e., with being in itself and not in relation to knowledge. Ontological doctrines are Platonism, materialism, idealism, and so on.

Ultimately, metaphysics is about the relation between knowing and being. There is a legitimate philosophical ontology which consists in derivations from metaphysical principles about reality. Being and knowledge are equivalences. Being is knowledge and knowledge is being. One concept cannot be understood without the other. None of the two can subsist independently. How do I get here and what are the implications? The distinction between being and knowing can also be expressed as the distinction between being and its representation. As what exists, being is the necessary grounds of knowledge. But the representation of being, which is also part of being, can be erroneous. Error surfaces mostly in interpretation. History corrects and validates interpretations. Hence, history is the ultimate expression of knowledge. History can also be defined as the becoming of being. As such it embraces representation and error. Consequently, even though history is, among other things, the history of human error, history is the common grounds for being and knowing. Finally, the being/knowing equivalence is tantamount to the being/representation of being equivalence. What this primarily implies is that being and its representation have the same ontological weight.

The implications are problematical. If there is no fundamental ontological difference between being and its representation, then error is on the same level as truth and delusion is the same as common sense. Among other unlikely equivalences we would have to accept sane/mad, love/hate, genius/stupidity, tragic/ridiculous, and so on. I would be no different from the sofa I see in front of me. Nazis and Jews would be indistinguishable. A neurotic would be psychologically robust and vice versa. Success would be the same thing as failure. It would only be a matter of our understanding of one and the other. This attitude is not as incredible as it seems. It has deep mystico-religious roots. It is of the essence in Tantric Buddhism, to be very specific. It is also embodied in the proposition that life is a dream, as in Calderón, or that life is a tale told by an idiot, as in Shakespeare. However, it is constantly inconsistent and difficult to sustain in the face of a rational onslaught. I follow my own reasoning to the point where history serves as a bridge between being and its representation. The problem is that history validates interpretation on a public and collective sense. Where does that leave the run-of-the-mill self-deluded individual?

Reason leads me to the conclusion that things exist and that the things in my mind have the same ontological status or weight as the things that exist. Mind-things are the equivalent of world-things. But I cannot conclude that mind-things exist independently of the world, because the argument is precisely that they are equivalent, and the problem is that the delusions of mind cannot be used to define reality. History validates interpretation. It has its say in the validation of certain type of propositions. Does it also affect the individual? The individual has only cognition and cognition is tainted by the specificity of self. But we cannot give up on history, for it is our only recourse in this matter. History necessarily encompasses the individual. There is no such thing as a private philosophy. In sum, the individual must submit to history if his ideas are to amount to something. Without such a submission, we are rudderless and we risk being shipwrecked by history. Rationally, it is history that breaks down the barriers between the self and the world.

In sum, history, from which nothing can escape, is the ultimate basis for the knowing being equivalence. But history is not time. It is time that encompasses everything. History is indeed about public and the collective events. But everything else is potential history. Therefore, even though we can distinguish between history and time, in another sense we can make no such a distinction.

"Ontology. 1. The branch of metaphysical enquiry concerned with the study of existence itself (considered apart from the nature of any existent object). It differentiates between `real existence' and `appearance' (as in noumenon and phenomenon) and investigates the different ways in which entities belonging to various logical categories (physical objects, numbers, universals, abstractions, etc.) may be said to exist. 2. The assumptions about existence underlying any conceptual scheme or any theory or system of ideas. Widely differing assumptions about `what there is not' and `what there is', are found in Parmenides and Plato, in Leibniz and Kant, and in modern phenomenology and analytical schools." (Flew)

Opacity

When propositions are unreliable or frankly erroneous they are said to be opaque. Opacity can refer to types of propositions. It can also mean the reference of propositions. In other words, any sort of proposition can be opaque and certain propositions tend to be opaque or are opaque by nature, so to speak.

Flew defines opacity as the breakdown of the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. What this principle expresses is that, in experience as opposed to logic or math, identicals are one and the same, hence non-existent in the plural. However, it can be said that Tully and Cicero are names for the same person and that Tully is Cicero in all respects. This is very contrived, but in a sentence such as "x believed that Cicero but not Tully attacked Catilina", this contrivance does illustrate how identicals can seem to be different. No matter how you turn it, though, the fact remains that what breaks down here is not identity--Tully is Cicero, only one person is involved--but x's knowledge of Roman history.

The "Tully is Cicero" example appears in Quine's Word and Object , where it serves to illustrate his belief that mind itself is opaque. Quine does not allow that statements about mind are reliable. However, statements as such can be used to make propositions about mind, and specifically about cognition. In the end, what Quine is exploring with this example is the possibility of error. His answer to the paradox of awareness is the canonical notation of predicate calculus.

Open texture

"Open texture is the correlate of the claim that a hypothesis can only be made more or less probable by any relevant evidence, and its opposite is determinacy of sense as understood in the Tractatus." (Hacker) Open texture then would correspond in my book to the "principle of uncertainty". It is in the same type of concepts as "family resemblance", "equivalence", etc.

"Of course, from my point of view the `epistemological' and the `ontological' are intimately related. Truth and reference are intimately connected with epistemic notions; the open texture of the notion of an object, the open texture of the notion of reference, the open texture of the notion of meaning, and the open texture of reason itself are all interconnected. It is from these interconnections that serious philosophical work on these notions must proceed."
H. Putnam, Representation and Reality (1988)

Optical illusion

Optical illusions are generally used to argue for the subliminal character of cognition. No matter that you know that some impression is illusory, you cannot avoid being fooled every time. A famous optical illusion is a Necker cube in which a drawing can seem to be either a flat surface or a cube depending on your mental "setting". Even though you know this at first glance, it can fool you into believing one thing or the other. Once you see a cube it is hard to see the flat surface even though in fact since it is a drawing it is a flat surface. What Necker cubes would seem to prove then is not only the subliminal but also the processual character of cognition. You see what you see in a Necker cube depending on how you process your perception of it

A mild optical illusion is even harder to shake off than a strong optical illusions. A mild optical illusion might consist of two circles of the same size one being surrounded by a thick dark ring. Why does the plain circle always seem larger?

Ordered pair

A pair is ordered when in the binary set a,b, either a>b or b>a or a = b. However, consider this from Stephen Schiffer's Meaning : "The IBS theorist might therefore identify a language with what David Lewis (1975) has called a grammar: (nearly enough) an ordered pair whose first member is a finite list of marks or sounds (the language's words), each one paired with a propositional constituent (the meanings of the words), and whose second member is a finite list of combining operations that assign propositions or propositional constituents to infinitely many finitely long sequences of the language's words." The relation here seems rather to be of the sort a <--> b, and this too is a type of order. Hence, an ordered pair is what obtains where there is any logical relation between two entities or propositions.

Ostensivity

Ostensivity is to define a thing by pointing at it. Since knowledge of the definition already exists, then ostensivity is merely illustration of a concept. It defines nothing. It gives an instance of a concept. Alternatively: language is a presupposition of ostensivity. Therefore, before any pointing is done, the object is already known. Ostensivity is useless as a definition or key to meaning.