Kant
Carl J. Friedrich, ed, The
Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings (1949)
Metaphysical Foundations of Morals
(1785)
Prolegomena
The thread that runs through this work is
the concept of the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is a rule of
conduct. It is dictated by reason on the assumption
that the will can be autonomous, i.e., not constrained. The assumption is three-fold: one, it is
Kant's assumption; two, it is Kant's assumption about an assumption of reason;
and three, it must be assumed by the commentator of Kant. What the categorical imperative in essence
says is that we must act in such a way that our maxims can be postulated as
universal moral laws. Kant tacitly defines maxim as the rational
expression of motive.
The development of this work is divided
into three parts. In the first part Kant takes a
commonsensical, "popular" approach to the categorical imperative. What this means is that the moral worth of
actions is that they are done for their own sake and not for the sake of some
ulterior result. Thus far goes common rational knowledge. Philosophy takes over when Kant argues
that, if we strip the will of everything but obedience to the moral law
itself, this obedience must be to a principle that is valid for all of
humanity and in all circumstances in which it is possible to act morally, and
this principle can only be expressed as the categorical imperative. He characterizes these approaches in part
as depending on practical examples. What Kant does in this work is give
successive justifications of the categorical imperative of increasing degrees
of complexity. And in the end he submits his own reasoning
to criticism in order to determine its limitations.
In the second section, he announces that he
is going to take the jump into metaphysics. He posits the relation reason/will: "the
will is nothing more than practical reason". But reason can give different sorts of
advise. With the categorical imperative, reason
advises that we act on rational principle alone, with no other objective in
mind. Once again he formulates the categorical
imperative, and he relates some duties to it, whereas before he had used the
same duties to explore the definition or the significance of moral worth or
moral meaning. This bringing in of practical examples is
not so much to justify duties from the moral or categorical imperative as to
justify the latter with practical examples. Then, he asks: but is there actually a
categorical imperative that springs from reason and not from experience? To answer this question is that he says he
is going to step into the metaphysics of morals, and subsequently he comes up
with the idea that man is and must always be an object to his own conduct,
never a means to something else, and this he formulates as a practical
imperative. But--and this is the metaphysical
clincher--if reason can by itself derive the moral imperative and if reason
and will are intimately conjoined--will being capable of commanding action
without regard to effects or ulterior objectives or motives--then the source
of morality is will itself, because it is will--more specifically the autonomy
of will--that makes it possible for reason to impose the categorical law. Hence, morality is rational will
legislating for itself. Or as Kant puts it: "The autonomy of the
will is the supreme principle of morality." On the assumption of its rationality, all
the moral imperatives can be derived from that principle.
The question then is: but is the autonomy
of the will real? Is this not just a figment of the mind? "To prove that morality is no mere creation
of the brain, which it cannot be if the categorical imperative and with it the
autonomy of the will are a true idea and are absolutely necessary as an a
priori principle, requires a synthetic use of pure practical reason. However,
we cannot venture into this without first undertaking a critique of this
faculty. In the concluding section we shall give the principal features of
this critique as far as is necessary for our purpose." From an autonomy of the will, Kant derive
the likely, virtually inescapable conclusion that the will is free, and since
we derived morality from the autonomy of the will, then from the analysis of
the concept of freedom too can be derived morality and its imperatives. However, Kant claims that all he has shown
is that morality is founded on the presupposition of freedom: it is only
freedom that makes possible the autonomy of will, and it is from the autonomy
of will that the conditions for morality: moral imperatives and behavior
according to moral imperatives, obtain. He has not shown that freedom actually
exists or is possible. The gist of his argument is: "Freedom must
be assumed to be a quality of the will of all rational beings." In fact, there is nothing compulsory about
morality: there is no reason why we should suppose that man is free.
To ground freedom, Kant appeals to the
distinction between phenomena and nourmena. Man belongs to nature and its laws, but he
also lives in the world of intellect. The place of man in nature is revealed
through the knowledge of phenomena. The other side of man is inferred as the
existence of the free ego, in a manner analogous to how we infer things in
themselves from phenomena. The inference of the ego is also related to
"reaching consciousness directly" and to "belonging to the world of the mind". In any event, man knows that he is subject
to the laws of nature but that he also belongs to the world of mind. In the world of intellect or mind he is
free. Kant argues that the same laws that apply
to the world of nature cannot apply to the world of intellect, just as
appearances cannot be subject to the same laws as noumena. Kant actually argues: since I know the laws
of nature, I am bound by the laws of nature. Similarly, since I know that I am of the
world of the intellect, I am bound by the laws of reason, and since reason
implies freedom, I am, from the knowledge of my place in the world of
intellect, free. [He is definitely confusing the knowledge
with the thing known.] But he goes further and he claims that
because we are part of the world of nature and its laws, then the laws of
reason somehow have the force of the laws of nature. But in the end he can only infer freedom. "The concept of a world of the intellect is
only a position outside the phenomena which reason finds itself compelled to
take in order to conceive itself as practical" [in the sense of moral
philosophy]. Reason cannot prove this world of the
intellect, any more than it can show why morality must be obeyed.
The strongest argument he finally has is
that just as he cannot give arguments for, no one can give arguments against
his postulates, because no one can really have more than appearances whether
of the realm of things or of the realm of mind. The human interest in morality stems and is
justified from the fact that it is possible. At any of the stages in his work, Kant's
basic concepts and definitions are the same. Good will, well being, and reason are
inseparable. The fundamental moral rule is the
categorical imperative, which consists in the rule that we should so act that
our conduct can serve as the model for the definition of a universal law. It is imperative because it is a dictate of
reason, and categorical because it must be obeyed for itself and not for an
ulterior end. To be free is to be able to act according
to reason. And to be moral is to act freely according
to the categorical imperative
FIRST SECTION
Transition from the common rational
knowledge of morality to the philosophical: "...[T]he proper object of nature for a being
with reason and a will [is] its preservation, its welfare, in a word its
happiness..." [This is half-hearted, certainly not
Aristotelian.] "The case is different when adversity and
hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the
unforntunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than despondent
and dejected, longs for death and yet preserves his life without loving it.
[If he does this] not from inclination or fear but from duty, then his maxim
[A maxim is the subjective principle of volition] has a moral worth." The psychology behind this is
preposterous. And Kant actually knows it, for he writes
later: "In fact it is absolutely impossible to
ascertain by experience with complete certainty a single case in which the
maxim of an action, however, right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds
and on the conception of duty." And: "In fact we can never, even by the
strictest self-examination, penetrate completely [to the causes] behind the
secret springs of action, since when we ask about moral worth, we are not
concerned with actions but with their inward principles, which we do not see."
Deciding runs the gamut from, in effect,
taking one's life to choosing how to kill the next five minutes. The process is of course psychological, but
not discretely so. Into deciding go perception, rationality,
affects, currently known particulars and "things" below the threshold of
consciousness, the past and expectations, and so on. They do not enter in ordered ranks, nor do
they exit after examination for keeps. They come higgledy-piggledy and they come
and go continually, often without our being aware of it. This is true of what to do next. But it is no less true of suicide. For suicide is a process and even if the
final decision might conceivably be ghastly cold--for which there is some
evidence--in the process the previous "disorderliness" must have been there
most of the time. Now, admittedly "disorderliness" might be a
matter of perspective, but it is a valid qualification as long as we do not
have unimpeachable grounds for arguing that everything has a rational cause. But, surely, even if there is a universal
order, this order can encompass some "chaos" without losing its composure. There may be instances of deciding from a
purely rational stance. But there are other things to be observed
here.
One, even as we are deciding we are
deciding. This is not wordplay: a decision is a
temporal process and reason is bi-conditional with memory. Even if we could actually lean the process
to the starkest essentials, it still requires memory and choosing between
evidences and moments, and these are not subject to precise rational decisions. In the end, we may indeed have decided on a
rational course for rational considerations, but this process is never
accomplished without the admixture of unreason or at least of circumstances
which cannot be rationally accounted for Two, the final decision could be not to do
something or to let something pass. It could be in brief a passive stance, and
this can mean not choosing to recall or to move and say things, but simply
allowing the mind to take its own course, in other words, doing nothing. Doing rationally, then, can be doing
nothing. The fact of the matter is that it is not
possible to find "will" in all the above. But what we do find is the hodgepodge of
the stream of mind, which may be rational, very likely is rational in the
sense of the universe being rational, but which we could no more prove to be
rational than we can say at precisely what moment and for precisely what
reasons I decided to fulfill a moral law]
"...[T]hat an action done from duty derives
its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from
the maxim by which it is determined. Therefore the action does not depend on
the realization of its objective, but merely on the principle of volition by
which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire...Duty is the necessity of an action
resulting from respect for the law."
Duty, morality, so on--are defined and
understood in terms and only in terms of obedience to a principle. Everything else--purpose, effects, goals,
so on--is to be disregarded, for nothing else has to do with with morality. Yet laws have purposes, so to obey the law
must be in pursuance of a purpose. To this Kant can allege his distinction
between laws and the principle or reason behind the laws. But this is as
spurious as the attempt to obliterate all thought of consequences from ethics!
It is not an exaggeration to say of Kant's metaphysics of morality that it
consists in the definition of duty, morality, maxim, law, principle, and so
on--will is assumed--with the reiteration that morality is obedience to the
law per se.
"But what sort of law can it be the
conception of which must determine the will, even without our paying attention
to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good
absolutely and without qualification? As I have stripped the will of every
impulse which could arise for it [in favor of it] from obedience to any law
[i.e., since he has made morality a question of obeying the law and nothing
more, even if the consequences are disastrous for the moral agent], there
remains nothing but the general conformity of the will's actions to law in
general. Only this conformity to law is to serve the will as a principle; that
is, I am never to act in any way other than so I could want my maxim also to
become a general law."
[Since it is conformity to the moral law
per se that is moral, then action must be such that it conforms to the
principle of all moral laws, and that is that they should be valid for all of
humanity in all circumstances.]
Then Kant cites lying promises and lying in
general, and he argues from the nefarious effects of the latter, as opposed to
the purpose involved in just one false promise, in defense of the principle he
has enunciated. To make a false promise could seem
necessary in order to fulfill a good promise, say, give a bank false balance
in order to obtain a loan to pay a needy creditor, but to do so would
constitute a justification of lying, and this would invalidate all promises. I could trust no one and no one could trust
me.
[Kant's argument here turns about the
Aristotelian analogy between akrasia and the syllogism. In Aristotle the akrates know the major
premise (evil is to be avoidad), but he cannot contemplate the minor premise
(this is evil), and thus he cannot draw a moral command (this is to be
avoided). In Kant, the evildoer disregards the major
premise and by using as minor premise that evil is sometimes justified. Now, Kant's example of the broken promise
contradicts the principle that effects have no bearing on morality, and the
only explanation I have for this contradiction is that we are using what he
calls "common rational knowledge".]
SECOND SECTION: Transition from popular moral philosophy to
the metaphysics of morals
"It is clear from what has been said that
all moral concepts have their seat and origin completely ya priori in the
reason, and have it in the commonest reason just as truly as in what is
speculative in the highest degree." [I will assume that this is "clear",
although I have misgivings of all sorts.] "Our purpose in this study must be not only
to advance by natural steps from common moral judgement, which is very worthy
of respect, to the philosophical, as has been done already, but also to
progress from a popular philosophy which only gets as far as it can by groping
with the help of examples, to metaphysics, which does not allow itself to be
held back by anything empirical and which goes as far as ideal concepts in
measuring the whole extent of this kind of rational knowledge wherever
examples fail us. [In order to accomplish this purpose] we must clearly
describe and trace the practical faculty of reason, advancing from general
rules to the point where the notion of duty springs from it." [There is implicit here a correspondence
between "common moral judgement" and "popular philosophy". "Metaphysical" would appear to be, in this
version, purely abstract thought. My own definition is that it refers to the
widest concepts, such as being, knowledge, awareness, reality, and so forth. Choice and "foundationalism" apply in this
realm of thought. There are no precedences and we can only
appeal to coherence. These are indeed abstractions, but I do not
see how I could deal with them without reference to language, which
necessarily refers me to experience, or to language and experience combined.]
"Everything in nature works according
to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty for acting according to the
concept of laws; that is, according to principles. (`Principles' and `concept
of laws' mean, then, the rationality or the reason behind laws.) [In other
words, rational beings alone] have a will. (Will and reason are intimately
conjoined.) Since deriving actions from principles requires reason, the will
is nothing more than practical reason. (Will is action, or it is the
antecedent to action. Reason comprehends principle. It informs will which
determines action. Thus, reason determines will.) If reason infallibly
determines the will, then the actions of such a being that are recognized as
objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary. The will is a faculty
for choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes
as practically necessary. But if reason does not sufficiently determine the
will by itself, if the latter is also subject to the subjective conditioning
of particular impulses which do not always coincide with the objective
conditions; in a word, if the will in itself does not completely accord with
the reason, as is actually the case with men, then the actions which are
objectively recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent...This means
that the relation of objective laws to a will not thoroughly good is conceived
as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason
which the will, because of its nature, does not necessarily follow.
(Apparently then the will can choose to ignore reason and the moral
imperative. But in order for the will to be thoroughly good it must obey
reason and the moral imperative.)"
"The concept of an objective
principle, in so far as it is compulsory for a will, is called a command of
reason and the formulation of such a command is called an imperative.
"All imperatives are expressed by the
word `ought' (or `shall') and are indicating thereby the relation of an
objective law of reason to a will, which, because of its subjective
constitution, is not necessarily determined by this compulsion...The
practically good determines the will by means of the concepts of reason, and
consequently from objective, not subjective causes; that is, [it determines
them] on principles which are valid for every rational being as such."
"Therefore imperatives are only
formulations for expressing the relation of the objective laws of all volition
to the subjective imperfections of the will of this or that rational being,
that is, the human will.
"All imperatives command either
hypothetically (If the action is good only as a means to something else, then
the imperative is hypothetical) or categorically...If the action is conceived
as a good in itself and consequently as necessarily being the principle of a
will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical...[T]he
categorical imperative directly commands a certain conduct without being
conditioned by any other attainable purpose...This imperative may be called
the imperative of morality."
"Happiness is an ideal, not of reason, but
of imagination resting solely on empirical grounds."
"...[T]he question of how the imperative of
morality is possible is undoubtedly the only question demanding a solution as
this imperative is not at all hypothetical, and the objective necessity it
presents cannot rest on any hypothesis, as is the case with the hypothetical
imperatives."
[The facts are that all action is
contextual and therefore its advisability cannot depend on reason and will
alone. Its advisability must depend on the
context.]
"[The categorical imperative or law of
morality] is [an] a priori (not empirical), synthetic (the term does not
contain the predicate: it cannot be derived by pure logic), practical
proposition.."
"When I conceive of a hypothetical
imperative at all, I do not know previously what it will contain until I am
given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative I know at
once what it contains. [This implies that the categorical imperative is not
always relevant or applicable, but how can we be faithful to reason and
morality and go around making all sorts of practical compromises? And
additionally if the categorical imperative is only justified in certain
situations, before we apply it or even think of it we have to work our way
from experience to pure reason, and Kant has expressly stated that the
categorical imperative is a prioristic.] In addition to the law, the
imperative contains only the necessity that the maxim conform to this law. As
the maxim contains no condition restricting the maxim, nothing remains but the
general statement of the law to which the maxim of the action should conform,
and it is only this conformity that the imperative properly represents as
necessary.
"Therefore there is only one
categorical imperative, namely this: act only on a maxim by which you can will
that it, at the same time, should become a general law...Since the
universality of the law constitutes what is properly called nature in the most
general sense [as to form]; that is, the existence of things as far as
determined by general laws, the general imperative duty may be expressed thus:
act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a general law
of nature."
[Next, Kant considers some duties to see
whether they can be derived from the categorical imperative and the first one
he turns to is not taking one's life. But in fact he had already done this in the
commonsensical part of his treatise where he defined the moral worth of a deed
as consisting in its accomplishment despite adversity. Let us assume that this time he puts this
duty on a more solid base by relating it to the categorical imperative
(although it rather seems not that the categorical imperative is justifying
duties but that priorly known duties are justifying the categorical
imperative). But, whichever way, he had formulated the
categorical imperative (or something very much like it) in the first part. We have advanced not one whit. And there's the objection that the example
he uses of not taking one's own life as a manifestation of the practical
application of the categorical imperative is really quite problematical. To go on living requires nothing. It can be multiply motivated. In fact, it does not even require a maxim
or a motivation. To find some sort of moral meaning in not
taking one's life would require, first, that one considered the possibility of
taking one's life; then, that one actually contemplated taking one's life;
and thirdly, that one then decided not to take one's life. But is this a moral decision stemming from
the categorical imperative? I doubt it for many reasons.]
"If we now watch ourselves for any
transgression of duty, we shall find that we actually do not will that our
maxim should be a general law in such cases. On the contrary, we will that the
opposite should remain a general law. We merely take the liberty of making an
exception in our own favor or (just for this time) in favor of our
inclination."
[Here Kant conforms to the Aristotelian
moral syllogism: the major premise is accepted, the minor premise is ignored. In Aristotle passion or some form of moral
blindness makes us ignore the minor premise: hence, we "lose" the knowledge of
good and evil. In Kant we deliberately make an exception
to the major premise: there is no question of ignorance.]
"Thus we have at least established this
much: that if a duty is a concept that is to have any import and real
controlling authority over our actions, it can ony be expresssed in a
categorical and never in a hypothetical imperative...However, we cannot yet
prove a priori that such an imperative actually exists; that there is a
practical law which commands absolutely by itself and without any other
impulse and that compliance with this law is a duty."
[All the duties he mentioned--e.g., not
killing oneself--depend for their justification on their consequences. The only real reason you cannot accept
suicide as a morally permissible action is not really that I cannot wish my
suicide to be universal law but simply that if we condoned suicide we could be
at the same time condoning a threat to the fabric of society. Yet he appears to believe otherwise. In any event, what he is now offering is
to discover a duty which is not empirically founded and which is in line with
the categorical imperative.]
"The question then is this: is it a
necessary law for all rational beings that they should always judge their
actions by maxims which they can will themselves to serve as general laws? If
this is so, then this must be related (altogether a priori) to the very
concept of the will of a rational being. But in order to discover this
relationship we must, however reluctantly, take a step into metaphysics,
although into a domain of it distinct from speculative philosophy; namely,
into the metaphysics of morals. In practical philosophy, where one is not
concerned with the reasons of what happens but with the laws of what ought to
happen though it never may...[we need not ask] for the grounds of pleasure and
pain, how desires and inclinations arise from it...[a]ll this belongs to an
empirical psychology...However, here we are concerned with objective practical
laws and consequently with the relation of the will to itself so far as it is
determined by reason alone, in which case whatever refers to the empirical is
necessarily excluded. For, if reason of itself determines conduct (which
possibility we are about to investigate), it must necessarily do so a priori"
"...[S]upposing that there were something
whose existence was in itself of absolute value, something which, as an end in
itself, could be a ground for definite laws, then this end and it alone, would
be the ground for a possible categorical imperative, i.e., a practical law.
Now I say that man, and generally every rational being, exists as an end in
itself, not merely as a means for the arbitrary use of this or that will; he
must always be regarded as an end in all his actions whether aimed at himself
or at other rational beings."
"Now, if a supreme practical principle
ought to exist, or a categorical imperative with respect to the human will, it
must be one which turns the concept of what is necessarily an end for
everybody because it is an end in itself into an objective principle of the
will which can serve as a general practical law. The basis of this principle
is that rational nature exists as an end in itself...Accordingly, the
practical imperative will be as follows: act so as to treat man, in your own
person as well as in that of anyone else, always as an end, never merely as a
means. We shall now inquire whether this principle can be realized."
[Kant interprets this practical imperative
in terms of the previous examples of duties and he finds their compatibility. This means he can derive the duty from the
principle. Then he argues that this practical
imperative is a priori, i.e., not derivable from experience. But the first argument is spurious: it is a
priori because it is universal in that it applies to all rational beings. But
death is also universal, and go infer or deduce that from pure reason!]
The second argument is that it is
objective: it presents man objectively as an object to him, not from purely
subjective causes. Since reason dictates to the will
objectively, it can be said that "the will of every rational being is a will
giving general laws", which when it does "the will is not being subjected
simply to law, but is so subjected that it must be regarded as giving itself
the law, and for this very reason is subject to the law of which it may
consider itself the author...I will therefore call this principle [of will
based on no interest] the principle of autonomy of the will as contrasted with
every other which I regard as heteronomy."
"Since the validity of the will as a
general law for possible actions is analogous to the general linking of the
existence of things by general laws which is the formal aspect of nature in
general, the categorical imperative can also be expressed as follows: act on
maxims which can have themselves for their own object as general laws of
nature. Such then is the formula of a thoroughly good will."
"The principle so act towards every
rational being (yourself and others), that he may for you always be an end in
himself, is therefore essentially identical with this other: act upon a maxim
which is generally valid for every rational being...In this way an
intelligible world is possible as a realm of ends, by virtue of the lawmaking
of all persons as members...Such a realm of ends would be actually realized if
maxims conforming to the canon of the categorical imperative for all rational
beings were universally followed."
"Morality is then the relation of actions
to the autonomy of the will, that is, to the possible general laws made by its
maxims. An action that is consistent with the autonomy of the will is
permissible, one that is not congruous with it is forbidden."
[This implies that good actions are not
those which are not forbidden: all good actions must have some positive intent
related to autonomy of will. There is a complex argument against this
implication. Since it is not possible for the will to be
always autonomous--sometimes we have to keep an eye on results--there is
implicit here a whole range of behavior which is neither good nor bad, and as
good is permissible and bad forbidden, but actions which are neither good nor
bad are permissible, then there are good actions which are not necessarily the
result of the autonomy of the will.]
The autonomy of the will as the supreme
principle of morality
"Autonomy of the will is that property by
which will is a law unto itself [it is not subject to constraints like
pleasure or pain, results, self-interest, etc.], independent of any property
of the objects of volition. The principle of autonomy therefore is: always so
to choose that in the same act of willing the maxims of this choice are
formulated as general laws...We shall then find that its principle must be a
categorical imperative and the latter commands neither more nor less than this
very autonomy."
[Autonomy commands autonomy, will commands
will, duty exists for the sake of itself--and all depend on reason and the
reasons of reason, including a will that is not thoroughly good.]
Heteronomy of the will as the source of all
false principles of morality: classification of all possible principles
of morality which can be founded on the basic concept of heteronomy
"The problem of how such a synthetic,
practical, a priori proposition [that the basis of morality is the autonomy of
the will] is possible and necessary cannot be solved within the limits of the
metaphysics of morals [very abstract thought about morality]. We have not
asserted its truth here, much less professed to have a proof of it. We have
simply shown, by the development of the universally accepted concept of
morality that autonomy of the will is inevitably connected with this concept
or, rather, is its basis...This section then, like the first, was merely
analytic [morality and autonomy of the will are biconditional]. To prove that
morality is no mere creation of the brain, which it cannot be if the
categorical imperative and with it the autonomy of the will are a true idea
and are absolutely necessary as an a priori principle, requires a synthetic
use of pure practical reason. However, we cannot venture into this without
first undertaking a critique of this faculty. In the concluding section we
shall give the principal features of this critique as far as is necessary for
our purpose."
THIRD SECTION: Transition from the metaphysics of morals
to the critique of pure practical reason
The concept of freedom is the key
explanation of the autonomy of the will.
[This sounds self-evident. It would be impossible for the will to be
autonomous--free of constraints--if it were not free, i.e., free of
constraints.]
"The will is a kind of causality of living
beings in so far as they are rational...What else can freedom of the will be
but autonomy; that is, the property of the will to be a law unto itself? But
the proposition the will is a law unto itself in every action, only expresses
the principle of acting on no other maxim than that which can also aim to be a
general law. This is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and
of the principle of ethics, so that a free will and a will subject to moral
laws are one and the same [subject but not necessariy constrained].
"If freedom of the will is assumed,
morality and its principle can be deduced from it by mere analysis of the
concept. However, the latter is still a synthetic proposition: that an
absolutely good will is one whose maxim can always be stated in terms of a
general law, still is a synthetic proposition."
Freedom must be assumed to be a quality of
the will of all rational beings
"I assert that we must necessarily attribute
to every rational being having a will the idea of freedom...Reason must regard
itself as the author of its principles independent of extraneous influences;
consequently, it, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being, must
regard itself as free."
Of the interest attaching to the ideas of
morality
"At last we have reduced the definite
concept of morality to the idea of freedom. However, we could not prove this
idea to be actually a quality of ourselves and of human nature; we saw merely
that we must presuppose it...So we find that on the same ground we must
attribute to every being endowed with reason and will this quality of obliging
itself to act under the idea of its freedom.
"Presupposing these ideas means
becoming aware of a law that the subjective principles of action, i.e.,
maxims, must always be taken as being objective, i.e., universal principles,
and so serve as universal laws of our own making. But why should I, simply as
a rational being, subject myself to this principle [and thus also subject all
other rational beings]? I will allow that no interest urges me to do
this...Therefore it seems as if moral law, that is, the principle of the
autonomy of the will, were actually only presupposed in the idea of freedom
and as if its reality and objective necessity could not be proved
independently ...[I]n regard to the validity of the principle and the
practical necessity of subjecting oneself to it, we [have not] advanced a
step...Nor do we see how all this is possible; in other words, why moral law
is obligatory.
"It must be freely admitted that
there appears to be a sort of circular reasoning here that seems impossible to
escape. We assume ourselves to be free in the order of efficient causes so
that we may conceive ourselves to be subject to moral laws in the order of
ends. Then we consider ourselves as subject to these laws because we have
conferred upon ourselves freedom of will...One resource remains: to inquire
whether we do not occupy different positions when we think of ourselves as
causes effficient a priori through freedom and when we consider ourselves as
effects of our actions which we see before our eyes."
"Man cannot even pretend to know what he is
himself from the self-knowledge he has from internal sensation...Nevertheless,
beyond the structure of his own subject, as made up of mere phenomena, he must
suppose something else as the basis of these phenomena; namely, his ego,
whatever its nature may be. In regard to mere perception and receptivity of
the senses, man must reckon himself as belonging to the world of sense, but in
regard to what may be pure action in him (reaching consciousness directly and
not by affecting the senses), he must reckon himself as belonging to the world
of the mind, of which, however, he has no further knowledge...Man actually
finds in himself a faculty which distinguishes him from all other things, even
from himself as affected by objects, and that is reason...First, so far as he
belongs to the world of sense, man is himself subject to the laws of nature
(heteronomy); second, so far as he belongs to the intelligible world, [man is]
under laws independent of nature which are founded not on experience but on
reason alone...Now we see that when we conceive of ourselves as free we
transfer ourselves into the world of the intellect and recognize the autonomy
of the will with its consequence, morality; whereas if we conceive ourselves
as obliged we are considering ourselves as belonging at the same time to the
world of sense and to the intellectual world."
How is a categorical imperative possible?
"Since the world of the intellect contains
the basis of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws, and so gives
laws directly to my will (as belonging entirely to the world of the
intellect), I, as an intelligence, must recognize myself as subject to the law
of the world of the intellect...I must regard the laws of the world of the
intellect as imperatives and the corresponding actions as duties [Isn't he
confusing here the thing with the knowledge of the thing?] ...But since I also
see myself as a member of the world of sense, [the categorical imperatives]
ought so to conform, which categorical `ought' is a synthetic a priori
proposition in so far as there is added to my will, as affected by sensible
desires, the idea of the same will belonging to the world of the intellect,
pure and practical in itself.
"The practical use of common human
reason confirms this reflection. There is no one, not even the most consummate
villain, only provided that he is accustomed to the use of reason, who, when
shown examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in obeying good
maxims...would not wish that he might also possess these qualities. Only his
inclinations and impulses prevent it and he wishes to be free from such
troublesome inclinations...The moral `ought' is then the necessary `will' of a
member of the intelligible world and he conceives it as an `ought' only to the
same extent that he considers himself a member of the world of sense."
Of the extreme limit of all practical
philosophy
"Therefore freedom is only an idea of
reason and its objective reality as such is doubtful, while nature is a
concept of the intellect which proves, and must necessarily prove, its reality
in examples of experience...The concept of a world of the intellect is only a
position outside the phenomena which reason finds itself compelled to take in
order to conceive itself as practical...But reason would be overstepping all
its bounds if it undertook to explain how pure reason could be practical; this
would be exactly the same task as explaining how freedok is
possible...[Freedom] is valid only as a necessary hypothesis of reason in a
being that believes itself conscious of its will. Where impulse ceases
according to laws of nature, there ceases all explanation also, leaving
nothing but defense, i.e., the removal of the objections of those who pretend
to have seen deeper into the nature of things and who thereupon boldly declare
freedom impossible. We can only show them that the contradiction that they
believe to have discovered arises only from man having to be considered as a
phenomenon in order to apply the law of nature to human actions...But this
contradiction disappears if one bethinks oneself and admits as reasonable that
beneath the phenomenon must lie at their root...the hidden
things-in-themselves, and that we cannot expect the laws of these to be
identical to those that govern their appearance.
"The subjective impossibility of
explaining the freedom of the will is identical with the impossibility of
discovering and explaining an interest which man could take in the moral
law...it is quite impossible that we human beings explain how and why the
universality of the maxim as a law, that is, morality, can interest man...The
universal maxim interests us because it is valid for us as human beings as it
has its source in our will as intelligences; in other words, in our proper
self. Whereas whatever belongs to mere appearance, reason necessarily
subordinates to the nature of the thing in itself."
Conclusion
"It is an essential principle of reason,
however used, to push its knowledge to a consciousness of its necessity
(without which it would not be rational knowledge). [In other words, is reason
valid?] It is, however, an equally essential restriction of the same reason
that it can neither discern the necessity of what is, or of what happens [this
is pure idealism], or of what ought to happen, unless a condition is supposed
on which it is, or happens, or ought to happen [some assumptions]. By
constantly inquiring into this condition, the satisfaction of reason is only
further postponed. Hence reason searches unceasingly for the unconditionally
necesssary and finds itself forced to assume it without any means of making it
comprehensible to itself...Therefore...human reason in general should be
reproached for not enabling us to conceive the absolute necessity of an
unconditional practical law...Thus we do not comprehend the practical,
unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, but we comprehend its
incomprehensibility, which is all that, in fairness, can be demanded of a
philosophy which aims to carry its principles to the very limit of human
reason."
CRITIQUE OF KANT
(1) Faulty psychology: Deciding runs the gamut from, in effect,
taking one's life to choosing how to kill the next five minutes. The process is of course psychological, but
not discretely so. Into deciding go perception, rationality,
affects, currently known particulars and "things" below the threshhold of
consciousness, the past and expectations, and so on. They do not enter in ordered ranks, nor do
they exit after examination for keeps. They come higgledy-piggledly and they come
and go continually, often without our being aware of it. This is true of what to do next. But it is no less true of suicide. For suicide is a process and even if the
final decision might conceivably be ghastly cold--for which there is some
evidence--in the process the previous "disorderliness" must have been there
most of the time. Now, admittedly "disorderliness" might be a
matter of perspective, but it is a valid qualification as long as we do not
have unimpeachable grounds for arguing that everything has a rational cause. But, surely, even if there is a universal
order, this order can encompass some "chaos" without losing its composure. There may be instances of deciding from a
purely rational stance. But there are other things to be observed
here: one, even as we are deciding we are
deciding. This is not wordplay: a decision is a
temporal process and reason is bi-conditional with memory. Even if we could actually lean the process
to the starkest essentials, it still requires memory and choosing between
evidences and moments, and these are not subject to precise rational decisions. In the end, we may indeed have decided on a
rational course for rational considerations, but this process is never
accomplished without the admixture of unreason or at least of circumstances
which cannot be rationally accounted for. Two, the final decision could be not to do
something or to let something pass. It could be in brief a passive stance, and
this can mean not choosing to recall or to move and say things, but simply
allowing the mind to take its own course, in other words, doing nothing. Doing rationally, then, can be doing
nothing. The fact of the matter is that it is not
possible to find "will" in all the above. But what we do find is the hodgepodge of
the stream of mind, which may be rational, very likely is rational in the
sense of the universe being rational, but which we could no more prove to be
rational than we can say at precisely what moment and for precisely what
reasons I decided to fulfill a moral law.
(2) Action is always contextual and it is
impossible not to consider its consequences. Duty, morality, so on--are defined and
understood in terms and only in terms of obedience to a principle. Everything else--purpose, effects, goals,
so on--is to be disregarded, for nothing else has to do with with morality. Yet laws have purposes, so to obey the law
must be in pursuance of a purpose. To this Kant can allege his distinction
between laws and the principle or reason behind the laws. But this is as
spurious as the attempt to obliterate all thought of consequences from ethics!
(3) The categorical imperative has only
limited applicability. "When I conceive of a hypothetical
imperative at all, I do not know previously what it will contain until I am
given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative I know at
once what it contains. [This implies that the categorical imperative is not
always relevant or applicable, but how can we be faithful to reason and
morality and go around making all sorts of practical compromises? And
additionally if the categorical imperative is only justified in certain
situations, before we apply it or even think of it we have to work our way
from experience to pure reason, and Kant has expressly stated that the
categorical imperative is a prioristic.]
"Morality is then the relation of actions
to the autonomy of the will, that is, to the possible general laws made by its
maxims. An action that is consistent with the autonomy of the will is
permissible, one that is not congruous with it is forbidden"
This implies that good actions are not
those which are not forbidden: all good actions must have some positive intent
related to autonomy of will. There is a complex argument against this
implication. Since it is not possible for the will to be
always autonomous--sometimes we have to keep an eye on results--there is
implicit here a whole range of behavior which is neither good nor bad, and as
good is permissible and bad forbidden, but actions which are neither good nor
bad are permissible, then there are good actions which are not necessarily the
result of the autonomy of the will.
(4) To go on living is not a moral issue. Next, Kant considers some duties to see
whether they can be derived from the categorical imperative and the first one
he turns to is not taking one's life. But in fact he had already done this in the
commonsensical part of his treatise where he defined the moral worth of a deed
as consisting in its accomplishment despite adversity. Let us assume that this time he puts this
duty on a more solid base by relating it to the categorical imperative
(although it rather seems not that the categorical imperative is justifying
duties but that priorly known duties are justifying the categorical
imperative). But, whichever way, he had formulated the
categorical imperative (or something very much like it) in the first part. We have advanced not one whit. And there's the objection that the example
he uses of not taking one's own life as a manifestation of the practical
application of the categorical imperative is really quite problematical. To go on living requires nothing. It can be multiply motivated. In fact, it does not even require a maxim
or a motivation. To find some sort of moral meaning in not
taking one's life would require, first, that one considered the possibility of
taking one's life; then, that one actually contemplated taking one's life;
and thirdly, that one then decided not to take one's life. But is this a moral decision stemming from
the categorical imperative? I doubt it for many reasons. All the duties he mentioned--e.g., not
killing oneself--depend for their justification on their consequences. The only real reason you cannot accept
suicide as a morally permissible action is not really that I cannot wish my
suicide to be universal law but simply that if we condoned suicide we could be
at the same time condoning a threat to the fabric of society.
(5) It cannot be argued that the practical
imperative is not derived from experience. Then he argues that this practical
imperative is a priori, i.e., not derivable from experience. But the first argument is spurious: it is a
priori because it is universal in that it applies to all rational beings. But
death is also universal, and go infer or deduce that from pure reason!
(6) He confuses the thing with the
knowledge of the thing. "Since the world of the intellect contains
the basis of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws, and so gives
laws directly to my will (as belonging entirely to the world of the
intellect), I, as an intelligence, must recognize myself as subject to the law
of the world of the intellect...I must regard the laws of the world of the
intellect as imperatives and the corresponding actions as duties [Isn't he
confusing here the thing with the knowledge of the thing?] ...But since I also
see myself as a member of the world of sense, [the categorical imperatives]
ought so to conform, which categorical `ought' is a synthetic a priori
proposition in so far as there is added to my will, as affected by sensible
desires, the idea of the same will belonging to the world of the intellect,
pure and practical in itself."
(7) His ontological apparatus is derivative. Descartes: "Man actually finds in himself a
faculty which distinguishes him from all other things, even from himself as
affected by objects, and that is reason." Berkeley: "Whatever [objects] are in
themselves remains unknown." Hume: "Every rational being considers
himself as belonging, as an intelligence, to the world of intellect and he
calls his causality a will simply as an efficient cause belonging to that
world. On the other hand, he is also conscious of being part of the world of
sense in which his actions are displayed as mere phenomena of that causality.
However, we cannot discern how they are possible from this causality which we
do not know."
"Human reason, then, is in a terrible bind.
By its very nature it is unable to avoid asking certain questions,
metaphysical questions, but it is unable to answer them, falling in its
attempts to do so into confusions and contradictions from which it cannot
liberate itself. These confusions and contradictions result from the fact that
reason begins with principles that are implicit in human experience and,
therefore, cannot be avoided but lead reason beyond experience to the realm of
pure speculation. Once there, according to Kant, reason cannot detect the
errors into which it falls because it has no means of verifying them
empirically."
"Human reason has the peculiarity that in
one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed
by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which as
transcending all its powers, it is not able to answer."
From Kant, "Preface" to the first edition
of Critique of Pure Reason
George Steiner on Alexis Philonenko, Le Théorie kantienne de l'histoire (Paris: Vrin), in TLS, May 1 1987, p. 468
The thesis of human progress
"It implies the very gradual, perhaps
asymptomatic congruence between human history--in which certain great
phenomenalities of amelioration are undeniable--and the prevalence of practical
reason (in the rigorous sense of the Critique) in the individual. A
threefold motion of spirit, at once individual and social, crowns Kant's vision.
Existentially and in terms of self-reflectivity, mankind is progressing (has the
obligation and the capacity to progress) from nothingness to totality or
wholeness, from a `curved' state to one of ethical and intellectual
straightness, and from the closed to the open conditions of mutual awareness (it
is this last modulation which entails Kant's ideas of universal peace). This
triple advance is not at all likely; but a probabilistic doubt does not inform
either its logic or its rootedness in the potential and the purpose of
humanity."
Bruce Aune on Roger J.Sullivan, Immanuel
Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge) in TLS, September 15-21 1989, p.1010
"Addressed to imperfectly rational beings who
are reasonably commanded to be moral, the categorical imperative can be
expressed in a deceptively simple way: `Act only on maxims that you can will to
become universal laws'...Kant offered some specimen derivations, but they are
very confusing and depend for their validity on apparently extraneous
`non-formal' claims about such things as nature's purposes, the aims of a
rational being, and the effects that would accrue if a certain maxim was
generally adopted [littering, for instance]...Kant's categorical imperative,
which requires one to decide whether one can will a certain thing, is intended
to abstract from the differences between rational beings and to presume that
only certain rational wants (or aims) should be considered."
Quassim Cassam on C. Thomas Powell, Kant's
Theory of Self-Consciousness (Clarendon), in TLS, January 18 1991, p.20
"In responde to the Cartesian conception of
the subject as an immaterial thinking substance, Hume claimed that he could only
find some particular perception or other when he `entered most intimately' into
himself, and so concluded that the mind is best thought of as a bundle of
distinct perceptions linked by the relation of cause and effect."
"A blunt response to the `bundle' theory
would be to point out that it is unintelligible to talk about a thought,
sensation or perception which has no bearer or `owner', a mind in which to
inhere. Even if one rejects the Cartesian account of the nature of that which
`has' thoughts, the ownership principle on which the blunt response is based
might seem a powerful anti-Humean weapon."
"Powell reconstructs Kant's central Deduction
argument as follows: for experience to be possible, the individual elements
presented by the senses must be ordered and unified (`synthesized') by the mind,
and this ordering requires that individual representations be thought of as
belonging to a single subject. Hence, `experience must be ordered by a unitary
subject who persists through, and is thereby the ground of, the synthesis of
experience.
"On one reading, this argument is indeed
closely related to the blunt response (the ordering of representations requires
the existence of an orderer), but Powell's considered view seems to be that what
the argument shows is the need for the representation of a unitary subject. This
is an important qualification, for it is one thing to say that thoughts must
belong [actually, what Cassam surely means is simply `belong'] to a unitary
subject, and another to say that they must be thought of as belonging to such a
subject."
"What unifies the bundle is not simply causal
connection but rather the thought of the individual elements as belonging to a
single subject who is responsible for unifying them."
[We must have the idea of self just as we
must have morality. Must be in Kant is the same as is. If is cannot be proven beyond doubt, then
must be is strong argument for is.]
Some of Kant's main works are: Critique of pure reason (1781/1787),
Prolegomena to any future
metaphysics (written 1783), Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals
(1785), Critique of practical reason (1788), Critique of judgement
(1790)
In what follows we will try to express some
of Kant's fundamental arguments.
GENERAL
Experience is a source of knowledge. Knowledge combines experience and a priori
intuitions. Representation per se does not entail space
and time. Reality is "endowed" by mind with space and
time. Through experience and representation we can
have indirect access to the external world. This access involves the "production" of
representations by things in themselves. But knowledge does not encompass things in
themselves. The ability of mind to have representations
endowed with time and space is what Kant calls transcendental idealism. It is not the knowledge of objects but the
knowledge of our knowledge of objects. The knowledge of our knowledge of objects
includes the a priori knowledge of time and space. Kant distinguishes his transcendental
idealism from empirical realism. In empirical realism it is assumed that the
world manifests time and space and that there is a separation between world and
mind. Space and time does not embrace or comprehend
things-in-themselves. Transcendental idealism distinguishes between
noumena, i.e., things-in-themselves, and phenomena as the appearances of noumena. The self cannot grasp the noumenal self but
only the empirical self of mental events. Ethics however entails the noumenal self,
which is unconstrained by causality and time and space.
INTRODUCTION TO CPR
All judgements are either a priori or a
posteriori. A priori judgements are not derived from
experience. They are universal and necessary. Judgements are also analytic and synthetic. Analytic judgements are those in which the
subject includes the predicate. They are explicative. In synthetic judgements the predicate is not
implicit in the subject. They are ampliative. Synthetic judgements can be a priori or a
posteriori. Synthetic a posteriori judgements include the
totally of caused events.
IN THE CPR THE PART ON AESTHETICS IS
ABOUT TIME AND SPACE
Space is a necessary condition for the
experience of objects. Time pervades all experience including both
objects and the mind. Space is not empirical. It is an a priori knowledge presupposed by
all possible experience. Time is also a priori and presupposed by all
possible experience. The subject can conceive or represent space
without objects, but objects cannot exist without space.
[However, babes can have experience without a
sense of space, even if only for a short time, while their muscle coordination
develops. In addition, the blind cannot see objects in
space but they have a sense of distance, which entails space. Hence, space is not innate.]
Again, the mind can have the representation
of time, but objects cannot exist outside of time. Time and space are intuitions. Time and space in themselves do not reveal
the world, but the world requires time and space. Time and space are equivalences. The contents of experience include time and
space. But experience is not equivalent to knowledge.
In the part on aesthetics in the CPR,
Kant sketches something like the paradox of awareness. The contents of experience are imbued by time
and space. But the contents of experience are not
necessarily true or knowledge. Knowledge is experience and judgement. The conditions of judgement make objectivity
and knowledge possible
The "Analytic" addresses the conditions of
judgement. The subject knows time and space intuitively. Yet all expressions of time and space are
theoretical. Hence, even though time and space are
undoubtedly knowledge, it is a knowledge that is inevitably controversial. This seems to imply that knowledge must be
expressible, but such is not the case, because I know what I see without ever
being able to express exactly what I see, or for that matter hear or feel or
smell.
CPR>"ANALYTIC"
The manifold of experience is unified by the
three-fold synthesis of apprehension in intuition, reproduction in imagination,
and recognition in a concept. This doctrine purports to be a refutation of
Hume's bundle theory of self. In the final part of the "Analytic", Kant
discovers four principles of reality: the axioms of intuition, the anticipation
of perception, the analogies of experience, and the postulates of empirical
thought. From the analogies of experience he develops
the concept of synthetic a priori judgements. These judgements involves subjective and
objective experience. Synthetic a priori judgements involves time
and experience. The experience of time yields the categories
of duration, succession, and simultaneity. Subjective experience is like seeing a house,
which involves different perspectives, or like the blind men palpating the
elephant. An objective experience is to see a ship on
the flow of a river. The irreversibility of objective experience
reveals the necessity of the law of cause and effect. Kant's deductions from the analogies of
experience are supposed to constitute a refutation of Hume's theory of
causality. The experience of the river's flow entails
irreversibility and irreversibility presupposes cause and effect. Hence, aprioritically every event must have a
cause.
Schopenhauer later said that whereas Hume
inferred consequence from sequence, Kant derived sequence from consequence.
CPR>DIALECTICS
The dialectics involves unconditioned
premises. Unconditioned premises imply transcendental
ideas beyond experience. It is the syllogism which yields
transcendental ideas beyond experience. The syllogism is of three types: categorical,
i.e., a = b, b = c, a = c; hypothetical, i.e., if a then b; and disjunctive,
i.e., either a or b. There are three classes of transcendental
ideas: the specific self derived from the thinking subject, the specific
cosmology derived from the world as the totality of appearances, and the
specific theology derived from the idea of God as the being of all beings.
The specificity of self is a paralogism. It consists in attributing substance to the
thinking being.
The four illusions of speculative cosmology
are antinomies. An antinomy is a form of thought in which two
conclusions derive from one premise.
The four antinomies are (1) that the cosmos
had a beginning and will have an end or that it has neither beginning nor end;
(2) that the whole is made of parts or that the whole is not made of parts; (3)
that freedom exists or does not exist; and (4) that the cosmos entails or does
not entail a necessary being. Kant resolves the third antinomy by claiming
that pure reason reveals causality but practical reason requires freedom. On the ontological argument for the existence
of God--the concept of God entails the existential predicate--Kant argues that
being is not a predicate. Having the thought of God does not make God
exist. The thought of 100 thalers adds not one whit
of value to 100 thalers. However, Kant argues that God and things in
themselves, though they cannot be shown to exist, are regulative ideas. They tell us of the world as it should be. They have heuristic value. The
Critique of practical reason is
not about what is but about what ought to be. Among the existents it postulates are
noumenal self, freedom, and God.
Summary
Kant's tried to reconcile rationalism and
empricism. His metaphysics means beyond experience. His quest for synthetic a priori statements
would be the basis of a reliable metaphysics. A priori are time and space, cause and
effect, and logic. A priori truths applied to experience would
produce synthetic a priori statements. But when Kant applied logic to basic concepts
such as self, world, ethics, and God he came up with antinomies, which cannot be
logically proven.
These notes are from Hamlyn
The individual is capable of objective
knowledge. But the individual does not necessarily
arrive at necessarily valid deductions from valid premises. Agreement with others through inter-subjective
leads to universal validation. According to Hamlyn, this position is
Wittgensteinian. The reaction against or at least after Kant
was idealism which implied a denial of the concept of things-in-themselves and
of the limits to understanding.
These notes are from Strawson
Kant posited things in themselves and as well
that the individual could not grasp them beyond their representation. His transcendental idealism refers to a
reality beyond perceived reality. Contemporary philosophy subscribes on the
whole to realism as a denial of things-in-themselves. However, Kant's arguments were for the
knowledge of time and space, which leads to the supposition of causality, and
for judgement and logic, and these arguments are compatible with the position
which rejects things-in-themselves. The realist position is that
things-in-themselves are things in experience. Kant did oppose this position, but the fact
that the individual cannot fully grasp reality does not lead to the denial of
reality, hence of things-in-themselves. Basically, then, according to Strawson, what
Kant thinks is that reality is what sensible beings can know and there is no
other source of knowledge.
These arguments are from Martha Klein
There are two possible interpretations of
transcendental idealism. In one interpretation the opposition between
appearances and things-in-themselves would seem to imply two different worlds. The other possible version is that we have to
do with two possible conceptions of the same world. Things-in-themselves are not subject to and
do not involve space, time, or causality.
[There is no coherence between these views. Things in themselves are not subject to
causation. They are also timeless. Timelessness and freedom go together. This means that the noumenal self is free and
eternal. These implications are incoherent because of
the incoherence itself of the concept of things-in-themselves. This is a prime example of the
verificationist claim that the incomprehensible or un-provable propositions of
metaphysics are meaningless.]
Allan Gibbard on David Gauthier, Morals by
Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press), in TLS, February 20 1987, p. 177
"Many think morality expresses concern for
others. If a stranger is drowning and I can throw him a line, I did so because
it would be terrible if he drowned. I want him not to drown, and that
constitutes my motive for rescuing him--a moral motive. Kant rejected this line
of thought, as missing the way duty puts requirements on us: I might not care
whether the stranger drowns, and still I would morally have to rescue him.
Recognizing my duty must lead me to act independently of my feelings, even
feelings of benevolence. The demands of duty must be demands of reason
independent of my preferences. So thought Kant."
